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THE LONGEVITY OF AMERICAN TERRORISTS:
FACTORS AFFECTING SUSTAINABILITY
I. PURPOSE OF THE PROJECT
This project was an outgrowth of two previous NIJ projects being conducted under NIJ’s
Research and Evaluation on Domestic Radicalization to Violent Extremism program area. The
first of these projects, which ended in 2015, focused upon testing one of the most prominent
theoretical models of extremist radicalization -- identity and framing theory.1 One of the
findings from examination of this theoretical model is consistent with the notion that “people
want to be associated with a winner.” Recruitment and commitment, crucial to the lifespan of
any terrorist movement, improve when the movement has been able to commit successful
terrorist incidents (Freilich, Chermak, and Caspi, 2009), particularly if the offenders escaped
unscathed. In the second project, which focused upon the temporal sequencing of terrorists’
precursor behaviors,2 a somewhat serendipitous finding emerged to crystalize the current issue.
A preliminary analysis of the differences between “lone actors” and members of “cells or
groups” revealed that lone actors “survived” substantially longer than members of cells or groups
before being arrested or indicted. Although we later found this relationship to be spurious, it was
worthy of further examination.
It distinctly appeared that the greater the length of time between the commission of a
terrorist incident by an individual terrorist (or cell) and their capture, the greater the attraction
to likeminded recruits who are wavering in their commitment to the cause and not yet
radicalized to violence. If longevity – the ability to commit acts of terrorism and evade capture –

1

NIJ Grant #2012-ZA-BX-0003, “Identity and Framing Theory, Precursor Activity, and the
Radicalization Process.”
2
NIJ Grant # 2013-ZA-BX-0001, “Sequencing Terrorists’ Precursor Behaviors: A CrimeSpecific Analysis.”

1

Final Summary Overview

has a positive impact on recruiting to radicalization, it becomes critical for law enforcement to
resolve terrorism cases as quickly as possible (see Jones and Libicki, 2008). To accomplish this,
we needed a better understanding of the factors that are associated with the survivability and
sustainability of individual terrorists and, if affiliated, the manner in which they interact with
their associates.
Unfortunately, it is not an issue that has been frequently discussed. Over the past twenty
years, the P.I. has attended and participated in numerous Anti-Terrorism Advisory Council
(ATAC) and JTTF meetings, state and local anti-terrorism training sessions, and training for law
enforcement personnel on pre-incident indicators of terrorism. The importance of the training
provided by these entities is unquestioned. However, an examination of what terrorists are
doing “right” is rarely mentioned. Instead, we routinely utilize a case study of a successful
interdiction to describe the successful tactics that led us to be able to make an arrest and
indictment. Our failures -- in this case, what terrorists are doing to successfully avoid capture -are seldom the topic of discussion. This project was intended to identify factors and behaviors
that terrorists had engaged in that significantly improved their chances for avoiding arrest.
Although there has been some discussion of the sustainability of terrorist groups in the
empirical literature (Freilich, Chermak, and Caspi, 2009; Crenshaw, 1988; Rapoport, 1992;
Hoffman, 1998), the focus of most of this research has been on the strategic decision making of
terror groups relative to target selection and delivery method rather than the tactical measures
taken to avoid capture. More recently, Suttmoeller, Chermak, and Freilich (2017) examined
factors associated with longevity relative to the extent of violence utilized among far-right
groups. Despite this exceptional work, we found no quantitative examinations of longevity and
sustainability at the individual level. With the advent of uncoordinated violence models in the

2

Final Summary Overview

1990s (e.g., leaderless resistance, lone actor terrorism, etc.), understanding the behavior of
terrorists not affiliated with terror groups has also become increasingly important.
For this project, we focused on five factors associated with individual longevity
mentioned either in the literature, as anecdotal information discussed by investigators and
prosecutors, or correlates found to be associated with group longevity. These included: 1) the
possible effects of changes in the Attorney General’s Guidelines for terrorism investigations; 2)
the impact of ideology, which may have indirectly affected longevity through gender, age, target
selection, and mode of operation characteristics; 3) lone actors versus group participation; 4) the
extent of participation in preparatory activity; and 5) the sophistication of the terrorism incidents
in which the person participated. Incidental to this examination, one additional factor emerged -the ability of terrorists to cross international boundaries.

II. METHODOLOGY
Data used in the analysis were compiled from the American Terrorism Study (ATS), an
Oracle 11g relational database composed of fifteen tables that includes information on the
demographic characteristics of terrorism offenders, federal charges and other legal variables, the
geocoded locations of perpetrator’s residences, pre-incident activities such as meetings and
precursor crimes, terrorism incidents in the United States, and temporal data on many of the
precursor activities and plotted incidents. A description of the ATS database, the method and
sample used in this project, and the types of analyses conducted are provided in the following
subsections.

3
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Sources of Data
The American Terrorism Study (ATS) is a compilation of data primarily derived from the
federal criminal court records of persons indicted for “terrorism or terrorism-related activities”
for the period 1980-present. In 1987, the FBI’s Terrorist Research and Analysis Center3
provided the principal investigator with the names of persons indicted under the FBI’s
Counterterrorism (CT) Program. After the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building bombing in 1995,
the FBI, NIJ, and the P.I. collaborated with the U.S. House of Representatives Judiciary
Subcommittee on Crime in which the House Subcommittee assumed sponsorship of the ATS. In
2002, the Senate Judiciary Committee assumed this role under Senator Jeff Sessions (R-AL).
From 2005-2012, the names of international terrorists indicted in federal courts were provided
through the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). Since that time, the names of domestic
terrorists have been extracted primarily from the websites of U.S. Attorneys offices and other
public sources. As such, the persons included in the database are indicative of the FBI’s official
definition of terrorism (e.g., see FBI, 1998). Since the FBI has exclusive jurisdiction over the
investigation of acts of terrorism against U.S. citizens or property, the ATS includes only
individuals and cases prosecuted in federal criminal courts.
Over the past fifteen years, the ATS has expanded from approximately 70 variables
related to group affiliation, ideology, demographics, and legal and sentencing variables to over
400 variables that include information on the geospatial and temporal distribution of the preincident (or precursor) activities of these defendants leading up to a planned or completed
terrorism incident. Older cases already in the ATS were revisited to collect data on additional
variables.

3

Later renamed the Counterterrorism Threat Assessment and Warning Unit.
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Data for the Current Quantitative Analysis
At the time of the current project, the ATS included 1,140 case studies linked to 1,425
federal “terrorism-related” court cases involving 1,922 indictees. Data collection was complete
on 605 terrorism incidents in the United States from 1980 to present. Analyses were limited to
the 693 indicted individuals in the ATS who were linked to the planning or completion of a
terrorist attack in the United States.4 To determine an individual’s “longevity,” the date of the
person’s involvement in their first preparatory activity as well as a “neutralizing” date (usually
date of arrest) were required to determine the duration of their “terrorist lifespan.” Sufficient
information to establish longevity (a “start” and “stop” date) was available on 346 persons in the
dataset, with connected incidents ranging from 1980 to 2015.
(Table 1 here)
A description of the variables and the manner in which they were measured is provided in
Table 1. Additional comment on coding of the dependent variable and one of the independent
variables is warranted. First, individual longevity has not been used in previous research.
Therefore, we utilized findings from prior literature on group longevity to help determine how
individual longevity should be categorized. Several studies have noted that the average terrorist
group lasted for about one year (Rappoport, 1992; LaFree and Dugan, 2009; see also
Suttmoeller, Chermak, and Freilich, 2017). The shortest category is six months, half of what
“average group longevity” has been estimated in previous research. A second category captures
six months less and six months more than the average lifespan of the group. The third category
included persons who participated in terroristic events from 18-36 months. The longest category

4

Eliminated persons had been indicted on charges related to material support, conspiracy, and other charges not
related to a specific planned or completed incident.
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is “greater than three years,” which is three times the average group longevity. Furthermore, it
appeared that “greater than three years” was significantly distinct from the other categories.
Second, we wanted to ascertain if changes in the Attorney General’s Guidelines on
Terrorism Investigations were related to the longevity of individual terrorists. While the FBI’s
definition of terrorism has not changed over the past forty years, major changes to the
“regulatory” definition, as provided by the AG Guidelines, have taken place on at least four
occasions during this period. These changes occurred during Levi, Smith, Ashcroft, and
Mukasey tenures as Attorney General. Measurement of this variable involved identifying under
which set of Guidelines an individual terrorist committed their first participation in a recorded
terrorist incident. These behaviors usually involved the person’s first preparatory behavior
recorded in the ATS. This date was then used to assign the person to one of the four Guideline
eras from which mean and median values were calculated. More details on this variable are
provided in the results and discussion sections.

III. MAJOR FINDINGS
Longevity was measured with two different indicators of central tendency. The mean
longevity for terrorists in the sample was 32.4 months. Interestingly, when using the median as
an indicator, the average longevity of individual terrorists drops to 15.86 months, a figure very
consistent with the estimated average lifespan of terrorist groups identified in previous research.
A summary of the distribution of these offenders across this variable is provided in Table 2. The
sample is fairly evenly distributed across our four longevity categories. Nearly one-third of the
terrorists 29.8%, 103 of 346) “survived” six months or less before arrest, while at the other
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extreme, one-fourth (25.4%, 88 of 346) of the sample was recorded as having longevity in excess
of three years. It is this latter group that we were most interested in.
(Table 2 about here)
Major Finding 1: Major changes to the Attorney General Guidelines combatting
terrorism have been associated with significant declines in the “lifespan” of individual
terrorists. As previously discussed, major changes to the manner in which terrorists were
investigated occurred during the tenures of four Attorneys General: Edward Levi (1975-1977),
William F. Smith (1981-1985), John Ashcroft (2001-2005), and Michael Mukasey (2007-2009).
Although there were a number of Attorneys General between each of these individuals, the
changes these AG’s initiated during their tenures lasted for many years. The era reflecting the
effect of the Levi Guidelines, therefore, extends from 1976 when he issued the Guidelines until
new guidelines were instituted by William French Smith in 1983. The Smith era extended to the
beginning of the Ashcroft guidelines created after the September 11, 2001 attacks. The Ashcroft
guidelines remained in effect until new guidelines were created by Michael Mukasey. The
Mukasey guidelines basically remain in effect today. Although minor modifications to the
guidelines on terrorism investigations may have been implemented by other AG’s between the
tenures of these four Attorneys General, the changes were mostly semantic.
(Table 3 here)
Terrorists who began their “careers” during each of these eras have remarkably different
longevities (See Table 3). Terrorists who began during the Levi era had a mean longevity of
2,230 days. The impact of Watergate, COINTELPRO, and the Privacy Act on FBI investigative
strategies are demonstrated in the Levi Guidelines and manifested in the ability of terrorists
during this era to operate almost with impunity. Introduction of the Smith Guidelines in March
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1983 significantly altered the ability and focus of the FBI in responding to terrorism. The
median lifespan of terrorists who began operating during the mid-1980s plummeted from 2,230
days to 1,067 days. This downward trend has continued as new guidelines have given law
enforcement more discretion in the investigative techniques employed. As of 2015, terrorists
who began committing terrorism or terrorism-related activities following introduction of the
Mukasey Guidelines have only had a mean longevity of 142 days, and a median longevity of 99
days. This pattern is presented visually in five-year increments in Figures 1 and 2 below.
(Figure 1 and Figure 2 here)
Major Finding 2: The longevity of individual terrorists varies significantly by ideology.
Environmental and Far-Left terrorists sustained themselves for substantially longer periods of
time than did Far-Right or Islamic Extremists. As Table 4 reveals, Far-Left and Environmental
terrorists averaged 5.4 and 4.3 years, respectively. In contrast, the longevity of Far-Right and
Islamic Extremists was, on average, two years or less. These differences reflect a variety of
influences. The Far Left, prominent during the Levi Guidelines era, had several terrorists who
avoided arrest for nearly a decade before their capture following implementation of the Smith
Guidelines. Members of the United Freedom Front are prime examples. The ability of some Far
Left and Environmental terrorists to cross international boundaries further contributed to their
longevity. Joanne Chesimard (Black Liberation Army), Victor Gerena (Macheteros), and
William Morales (FALN) all evaded capture by escaping to a foreign country. The longevity of
some Far Left and Environmental terrorists continues to this day, due to their fugitive status. In
contrast, the Far-Right and Islamic Extremists emerged at a time when the implementation of
new AG guidelines (Smith and Mukasey, respectively), negatively impacted the life course of
these terrorists. The most dramatic increases in terrorism indictments and arrests over the past
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forty years occurred at two points in our history: 1) immediately after the implementation of the
Smith AG Guidelines in 1983 (when the Far-Right declared “War in ‘84”) and 2) in 2002 when
implementation of the Ashcroft Guidelines and the PATRIOT Act following the September 11,
2001 attacks resulted in a significant increase in indictments for international terrorists involved
in “material support.”
(Table 4 here)
Major Finding 3: Ideology also plays an indirect role in longevity due to its
relationship with other variables. Gender and Educational attainment are significantly related to
longevity. As Table 5 reveals, a slightly higher percentage of females than males (38.6% vs
23.5%, respectively) may be categorized as having “very long” longevity (longer than three
years), while the percentage of males classified as having “short” longevity (six months or less)
is twice as high as that for females (31.8% vs. 15.9%, respectively). To some extent this may be
attributed to the roles of women in terrorist groups. Female terrorists have tended toward two
types of roles, either leadership roles among Far Left groups or in support roles among Far Right
and Islamic Extremist groups. Both of these role types are associated with longer longevity.
Males, in contrast, have been more likely to engage in overtly criminal preparatory behavior as
well as actual incident participation than females. Both of these types of behaviors are
significantly more likely to attract the attention of law enforcement.
(Table 5 here)
Furthermore, the greater one’s educational attainment, the longer terrorists have been
able to avoid indictment. This general pattern manifests itself both among groups and lone
actors and is also a function of group ideology. Leftist terrorists, who dominated American
terrorism statistics during the Levi Guidelines era, where also characterized as having a
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substantially larger proportion of females in leadership roles, many of whom were college
graduates. The same was true of environmental terrorists during the late 1990s and early 2000s.
Even among the Far Right, leaders such as Louis Beam, Richard Butler, and Robert Miles were
well educated, and while they did not avoid indictment, they successfully avoided conviction.
Major Finding 4: The type of terrorist incident planned or committed is highly related
to longevity in two fundamental ways: 1) as a result of the sophistication of the incident, and 2)
as a result of the extent of preparation necessary to carry out the incident. These findings are
summarized in Table 6 below. First, one of the most significant findings involves the
sophistication of the terrorist incident committed, albeit efforts to measure sophistication,
including ours, can be somewhat arbitrary. Despite this, the less sophisticated the planned or
committed attack, the longer the longevity of the individual terrorists involved in the incident.
There may be a number of reasons for this relationship that we were not able to measure. It may
be that more sophisticated incidents result in the greater allocation of law enforcement resources;
or it may be that more sophisticated explosive devices provide better forensic evidence to be
used in solving the crime. While both of these contentions may be true, we were able to measure
two other indicators relative to sophistication that may be associated with the relationship
between sophistication and longevity.
(Table 6 here)
It was our contention that the more sophisticated the planned incident: 1) the greater the
number of meetings (if it involved multiple offenders) would be required during the planning
process; and 2) the greater the number of preparatory activities would be necessary to complete
the incident. Both of these types of activities (number of meetings and preparatory activities)

10
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have been found to be negatively related to the successful completion of terrorist incidents,5
suggesting that early intervention and/or arrest were also linked to these two variables. As
expected, both of these relationships were significantly related to longevity in the direction
predicted. The more meetings that were held in advance of the incident and the more
preparatory behaviors committed per incident, the shorter the longevity of the individual
terrorist.
Finally, we specifically examined some of the terrorists who were outliers – those who
had “survived” the longest without being arrested or captured. These included Joanne
Chesimard (Black Liberation Army), Victor Gerena (Macheteros), William Morales (FALN),
Elizabeth Duke (May 19th Communist Party), and three members of the environmental group
known as “the family “—Josephine Overaker, Joseph Dibbee, and Rebecca Rubin. Chesimard
(aka Assata Shatur) escaped from prison in 1979 and resurfaced in Cuba. She remains there
today. William Morales also escaped from custody in 1979, made his way to Mexico, where he
resurfaced in 1983 during a shootout with Mexican authorities. He was convicted in Mexico on
charges related to the shooting, but was granted permission to emigrate to Cuba, despite U. S.
extradition efforts. The escapes of both of these individuals have been attributed to Marilyn
Buck, leader of the May 19th Communist Party. She died in 2010, following her release from
federal prison the previous month. Also affiliated with this group was Elizabeth Duke, who
remains a fugitive, whereabouts unknown. Cuban exile has been a successful strategy to avoid
incarceration for Chesimard, Morales, and Victor Gerena, a member of the Macheteros who
robbed the Wells Fargo depot in Hartford, Connecticut in 1983. All three remain in Cuba as of
this writing.
5

See Smith et al., Sequencing Terrorists’ Precursor Behaviors: A Crime Specific Analysis.
Final Summer Overview, NIJ Award # 2013-ZA-BX-0001.
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Others with extremely long longevity include three members of the environmental group
known as “the family,” with ties to both ALF (Animal Liberation Front) and ELF (Earth
Liberation Front). These include Josephine Overaker, who was indicted in 2006, but has never
been captured. She is believed to be overseas. Rebecca Rubin, also indicted in 2006, was
originally from Canada and fled there after her indictment. She turned herself in at the U.S.
border in 2012 and was released from prison in 2016. Joseph Dibbee, who had been a fugitive
since his indictment in 2004, was arrested in Cuba while on his way to Russia in August, 2018.
The most common attribute of these persons with extreme longevity involved a leftist or
anarchist ideology and the utilization of international boundaries to evade capture.

IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY AND PRACTICE
While the FBI has shied away from domestic intelligence gathering since the Watergate
era, more recent iterations of Attorney General Guidelines have provided the FBI with additional
tools, allowing them to intervene earlier in suspected terrorism cases. Our findings seem to
suggest that strategic changes in policy and practice have resulted in shortening the longevity of
terrorists in the United States. In particular, the post-9/11 Ashcroft and Mukasey-era Guidelines
cleared some bureaucratic red tape for FBI field offices to follow leads, initiate terrorism
investigations, and monitor suspects for longer periods of time. Also since 9/11, the U.S.A.
Patriot Act empowered federal investigators to open assessments and secretly surveil terrorism
suspects, such as by monitoring private communications and financial transactions. In short,
changes in Attorney General Guidelines have seemingly played some role in keeping the
American public safe by equipping law enforcement with the ability to more effectively mitigate
terrorist threats.

12
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Changes in Attorney General Guidelines over the last several decades have loosely
aligned with shifts in the nature of American terrorism and the threats posed by distinct types of
groups and lone actors. Our research shows that estimations of how long terrorists survive
depends in large part on the ideological movement to which terrorists adhere. We know, for
instance, that the average longevity of extreme leftists and environmental terrorists has been
elongated in part due to a select number of terrorists traveling overseas and evading arrest. As
these terrorists are usually of relatively higher social status, they have the means and social
capital for international travel and utilizing protective networks of likeminded extremists.
Perhaps the evasion of arrest by suspected terrorists fleeing the country has become more
challenging in the modern era of homeland security, helping to explain why the longevity of
terrorists has decreased over time. Therefore, we can conclude that the U.S. counterterrorism
strategy not only requires closely monitoring suspected terrorists who seek entry to the country,
but also to those who seek to flee it.

In addition to international travel, left-wing and

environmental terrorists may endure increased longevity because of their modus operandi, in
particular their historical reluctance to commit lethal, mass casualty attacks which may come
with higher risks of detection by authorities. In other words, the approach of left-wing and
environmental terrorists are more reflective of guerilla warfare tactics designed to methodically
wear down the enemy, unique from other terrorists who stage high-profile terrorist spectaculars.
Our study also revealed that terrorists who plan and execute less sophisticated attacks
survive longer. One relatively straightforward explanation is that the weapons used in less
sophisticated attacks are usually purchased legally and are easily obtainable by terrorists without
raising the suspicions of law enforcement or other possible witnesses. More elaborate attacks,
such as those involving bombings or the use of CBRN materials, often require research, training,
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and testing – all activities that increase risks of detection due to being digitally or physically
traceable. While tracking the purchase of some weapons used by terrorists (e.g., paint, hand
tools) would be untenable, restricting access to moderately sophisticated weapons like firearms
for persons on terrorist watchlists is a viable approach to reducing the longevity of some
terrorists.

Furthermore, as terrorists’ preparatory activities may occur across jurisdictional

boundaries, enhancing federal, state, local, and tribal intelligence sharing capabilities will remain
critical to thwarting these less sophisticated plots.
Unfortunately, though perhaps not surprisingly, our findings tell us that terrorists who
successfully survive the longest provide law enforcement the fewest opportunities to intervene in
their plots. Terrorists who meet with others less frequently and commit fewer preparatory acts
are able to carry on longer prior to their eventual arrest and indictment. As such, the public
arguably holds some responsibility for reporting suspicious, yet not necessarily criminal,
behaviors observed both in-person and online to local law enforcement. Continued efforts to
inform the public though informational campaigns, like the well-known “see something, say
something” campaign, are necessary to prime the public’s attention and willingness to notify
authorities when something seems out place or abnormal. The U.S. has undoubtedly constructed
a formidable homeland security apparatus responsible for preventing terrorists attacks since 9/11.
However, an alert public and interconnected system of federal, state, local, and tribal law
enforcement agencies capable of connecting the dots will be needed to curtail the longevity of
terrorists operating in the U.S. in years to come.
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Appendix A: Tables
Table 1: Variables
Variable
Education

Gender

Measure
Highest known education level at career
beginning

Length of time in days from the
individual’s first known preparatory
behavior to the time of their neutralizing
arrest

Ideology

Individual’s ideological category

Preparatory
Average
Meetings
Average
Sophistication
Guideline Era

Coded into three
categories: up to a high
school education, above
high school (e.g. bachelors
or some
professional/vocational
school), and above
undergraduate (e.g. some
post-graduate education)

Sex, male or female

Longevity

Lone Actor Type

Notes

Highest incident level of participatory
involvement

Number of preparatory activities linked
to person divided by number of incidents
over career
Number of preparatory meetings linked
to that person divided by number of linked
incidents over career
Highest level of incident sophistication
individual linked to over career
Era of Attorney General Guidelines
individual’s career began in

17

Longevity is grouped
into four categories: short
(0-6 months), moderate (618 months), long (18
months to 3 years), and very
long (over 3 years)
Categories include Farleft, Far-right,
Environmental, and Islamic
Extremist
Based on individual’s
involvement across
incidents, collapsed into
participation as a group or
loner – e.g. if an individual
participated in one incident
alone and another as a
group, their lone actor type
is coded as group

Sophistication is coded
into least, moderately, and
most sophisticated
A.G. guidelines are
broken into four eras: Levi
(1976-82), Smith (1983-00),
Ashcroft (2001-05), and
Mukasey (2006-present)

Final Summary Overview

N
Short
Moderate
Long
Very Long
Total

103
85
70
88
346

Table 2: Longevity Descriptives
Mean Days
%
(Months)
29.8
75 (2.5)
24.6
341 (11.4)
20.2
790 (26.3)
2779
(92.6)
25.4
100.0
973 (32.4)
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Median Days
(Months)
72 (2.4)
338 (11.3)
758 (25.3)
1902 (63.4)
469 (15.86)
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Table 3: Guideline Era Descriptives
N

Median Days

Mean Days

Levi
Smith
Ashcroft
Mukasey

22
244
37
39

2888
548
338
99

2230
1067
561
142

Total

342

476

981
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Table 4: Longevity by Ideology
N

Median Days

Mean Days

Far-left
Far-right
Environmental
Islamic Extremist

46
159
53
88

729
271
883
382

1989
672
1591
612

Total

346

469

973

Table 4 Alternate Chart
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Table 5: Perpetrator Characteristics
% (n)
% (n)
% (n)
% (n)
Short
Moderate
Long
Very Long
Gender
Male
Female

31.8 (96)
15.9 (7)

25.2 (76)
20.5 (9)

19.5 (59)
25.0 (11)

23.5 (71)
38.6 (17)

Education
High School
College
Post-Graduate

40.2 (41)
25.8 (34)
14.3 (3)

18.6 (19)
30.3 (40)
19.0 (4)

21.6 (22)
22.7 (30)
23.8 (5)

19.6 (20)
21.2 (28)
42.9 (9)

Ideology
Far-left
Far-right
Environmental
Islamic Extremist

10.9 (5)
35.8 (57)
20.8 (11)
34.1 (30)

8.7 (4)
25.2 (40)
22.6 (12)
33.0 (29)

43.5 (20)
18.9 (30)
9.4 (5)
17.0 (15)

37.0 (17)
20.1 (32)
47.2 (25)
15.9 (14)

Sig.
.055

.032

.000

Table 6: Incident Characteristics
% (n)
% (n)
% (n)
Short
Moderate
Long

% (n)
Very Long

Lone Actor Type
Loner
Group

36.4 (8)
35.7 (81)

22.7 (5)
26.0 (59)

13.6 (3)
13.7 (31)

27.3 (6)
24.7 (56)

Preparatory Average
1 – 8 acts
9 acts

27.8 (69)
29.9 (23)

21.8 (54)
32.5 (25)

20.6 (51)
23.4 (18)

29.8 (74)
14.3 (11)

Meetings Average
0
1
2+

24.5 (35)
30.2 (29)
34.1 (31)

25.9 (37)
19.8 (19)
26.4 (24)

27.3 (39)
12.5 (12)
19.8 (18)

22.4 (32)
37.5 (36)
19.8 (18)

Incident Sophistication
Least
Moderately
Most

28.6 (18)
43.8 (14)
37.3 (57)

11.1 (7)
34.4 (11)
30.1 (46)

6.3 (4)
9.4 (3)
17.0 (26)

54.0 (34)
12.5 (4)
15.7 (24)

Sig.
.987

.037

.014

.000
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Appendix B: Figures
Figure 1: Mean Longevity By 5-Year Intervals
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Figure 2: Median Longevity by 5-Year Intervals
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